The formation of centres of power, profit and protection: conflict and social transformation in Eastern DR Congo by Vlassenroot, Koen & Raeymaekers, Timothy
 
OCCASIONAL 
PAPER 
Centre of African Studies 
University of Copenhagen  
            
 
 
 
 
 
The Formation of Centres of 
Profit, Power and Protection 
Conflict and Social Transformation in 
Eastern DR Congo 
  
 
 
Koen Vlassenroot & 
Timothy Raeymaekers 
 
 
January 2005 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
ISBN 87-91121-17-5
 
The Formation of Centres of Profit, 
Power and Protection 
Conflict and Social Transformation in 
Eastern DR Congo 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Koen Vlassenroot  
&  
Timothy Raeymaekers 
 
 
Department of Third World Studies 
Faculty of Political and Social Sciences 
University of Ghent 
 
 
 
January 2005 
 
 
 
Dr. Koen Vlassenroot visited the Centre of African Studies 
on 14 September 2004 where he as part of his ongoing 
research on the Democratic Republic of Congo gave a 
seminar on “Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern 
Congo”. This Occasional Paper is a revised version of his 
presentation written together with Timothy Raeymaekers.  
 
Koen Vlassenroot and Timothy Raeymaekers belong to the 
Conflict Research Group at the University of Ghent. 
 
 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
 
Introduction 1 
 
 
1.  The Congolese War Complex  4 
 
 
2.  Processes of Social Transformation in eastern DRC 9 
 
 
3.  State Implosion and Ethnic Politics: Two Reinforcing            17 
 Dynamics 
 
 
Conclusion  20 
        
 1
                                                          
Introduction1
In 2003, there was renewed hope that the cycle of violence that was 
ravaging through many parts of Africa could be brought to an end with 
the signing of peace agreements, new processes of state-building and 
the promotion of democratic reforms. One year later, most of this 
optimism has faded: while many peace processes have proven short-
lived, most have set in motion new dynamics of conflict that are 
contingent on previous war situations. One reason for the failure of this 
‘New Peace’ in Africa is that it has not adequately dealt with local conflict 
dynamics. Peace-builders often see armed conflicts as an object of 
intervention rather than as a complex outcome of (foremost local) conflict 
dynamics. While focusing mainly on institution building at a ‘national’ 
level, this technical and formalistic approach to peace-building thus 
largely ignores the underlying causes of violence that are sustained at a 
local level2.  The result of this approach is that the implementation of 
peace accords may bring some form of stability to the urban centres 
(often guarded by international forces), but leaves the rural populations 
in the midst of unending low-intensity conflict3.  
 
Another reason for this failure is that the current drive towards peace in 
Africa has largely neglected the organisational shifts in local societies at 
times of conflict.  In most conflict regions, however, the decrease in the 
competence of the state and the formation of rebel movements and 
militias (non-state actors that often impose themselves on large 
1  Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the Centre of African Studies, University of 
Copenhagen, 14 September 2004 and the Centralafrikagruppen, Stockholm, 22 September 
2004.  The paper is based on fieldwork carried out in March, May, July and December 2003.  
The authors are much indebted to NiZA, 11.11.11 and Novib for their financial assistance. 
2  Autesserre, S., The Politics of the Peace Process in eastern Congo, mimeo, 2004. For a 
similar argument, see: Ottaway, M., Rebuilding State Institutions in Collapsed States, in: 
Development and Change, 33 (5), pp. 1000-1023. 
3  Richards, P., Fighting for the Rain Forest.  War, Youth and Resources in Sierra Leone 
(Porthsmouth: Heinemann, 1996). 
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territories and populations), have given leeway to the formation of new, 
non-state centres of authority that have in turn introduced new modes of 
political, social and economic control.  Contrary to the dominant 
discourse that war-torn societies find themselves caught in a conflict-
trap4, most conflicts tend to produce new orders out of anarchy and 
destruction. Although these new orders are almost invariably violent, 
exploitative, and illiberal in character, these are “orders, not anarchy”, 
and their development sometimes constitutes the best chance for a 
country or community to emerge into something worthy the expression of 
‘post-conflict’5.  
 
One method in which to evaluate the durability of these new social 
orders is to look at the ways local actors (militia-members, local 
businessmen and grassroots populations alike) try to reduce and 
manage risks in situations of enduring conflict6. It has often been argued 
– especially by the so-called ‘war economy’ theories – that war produces 
important opportunities for those that are willing to take the risks 
involved7. Implicit in this argument is that these opportunities often 
provoke important shifts in the social and economic organisation of war-
torn societies. These shifts not only include new processes of local ‘elite’ 
accommodation and adaptation, but also involve different patterns of 
socio-economic interaction between elites, non-state armed actors and 
grassroots populations – giving rise to alternative forms of power, profit 
4  Collier has defined this trap as “virtuous and vicious circles of failure and destruction that 
increase the risk of further war”. See: Collier, Breaking the Conflict Trap: The Civil War and 
Development Policy (Washington and Oxford: The World Bank and Oxford University Press, 
2003). 
5  Menkhaus, K., Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia, in: Conflict, 
Security and Development, 4 (2), August 2004, p. 163. 
6  One of the few studies on grassroots strategies of adaptation in conflict zones is offered by 
Korf, B., War, Livelihoods and Vulnerability in Sri Lanka, in: Development and Change, 35 (2), 
pp. 275-295. 
7  Longley, C. and Maxwell, D., Livelihoods, Chronic Conflict and Humanitarian Response: A 
Synthesis of Current Practice, Overseas Development Institute, Working Paper 182. See also: 
Berdal, M. and D. Malone, eds., Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars 
(Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2000); Keen, D., The Economic Functions of Violence in Civil Wars, 
Adelphi Paper n° 320 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 
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and protection. In our view, it is the negligence of these new local orders 
by peace-builders which helps to explain why many conflict zones have 
shifted from low-intensity conflict to violent peace after the introduction of 
largely exclusive peace deals and transition processes. 
 
One of the most prominent examples of these organisational shifts and 
their negligence by the international community’s efforts to bring about 
peace is the conflict and transition process in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo.  Since the start of the transition and the official end of the 
Congolese war, in June 2003, the threat of conflict and instability has 
loomed ominously, because a number of actors have expressed their 
hesitation towards the peace process or have acted against their 
exclusion from the transitional institutions.  These ongoing developments 
highlight the vulnerability of internationally sponsored efforts at 
instigating a ‘transition’ to peace and democracy in the DRC.  Yet at the 
same time they remind us that important questions about the socio-
economic dynamics that underlie the seemingly intractable phenomenon 
of war in the eastern DRC remain unanswered; indeed, many remain 
unasked. 
 
These underlying social dynamics are at the centre of this article, which 
wants to make a strong case that efforts to end war and promote 
sustainable development in the eastern parts of the DRC should be 
grounded in attention to phenomena that lie beneath the more often 
discussed international and regional dimensions of the conflict.  It is one 
of the underlying ideas that chronic violence cannot be understood 
purely with reference to the strategies developed by powerful local and 
international actors.  Rather, the seeming intractability of the Congolese 
conflict can only be fully understood with reference to the ways in which 
conflict—together with a legacy of colonial and state policy that preceded 
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and informed it—has reshaped structures of opportunity and meaning at 
the level of ‘grassroots’ interaction. By contrast with traditional 
perspectives that explain the Congolese conflict in terms of dynamics set 
in motion ‘from above,’ this article stresses the need for a better 
understanding of the local, ‘micro-level’ dynamics of conflict and the 
organisational shifts these dynamics have produced.   
 
1.  The Congolese War Complex 
When studying the Congolese war, one cannot but emphasise the dire 
humanitarian consequences of this ten-year old conflict. The war in 
eastern DRC has generated one of the most severe humanitarian crises 
since the Second World War8.  In a conflict that has involved over six 
African nations and more than a dozen rebel groups, more than 3 million 
Congolese have died either as a direct or an indirect consequence of 
these armed confrontations9. Many have lost their physical and financial 
belongings, while the war has led to the displacement of hundreds of 
thousands of people, which continue to be dispersed until today10. 
 
One of the reasons for this humanitarian disaster was the multiplication 
of actors since the start of the Congolese conflict. Many individuals and 
8  Mid-2000, the UN Secretary-General reported that “humanitarian needs in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo have attained massive proportions, with some 1.3 million internally 
displaced persons and 300,000 refugees, and a further estimated 14 million people are in 
need of humanitarian assistance”: United Nations, Second Report of the Secretary General on 
the United Nations Organisation Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, 18 April 
2000, New York  (S/2000/330). For a discussion of the recent evolution, see: International 
Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results from a Nationwide 
Survey, conducted in September-November 2002, and reported in April 2003 – although the 
IRC data have been questioned by some observers. For a detailed follow-up, see the 
numerous weekly reports by OCHA, the United Nation’s humanitarian assistance programme.  
9  See International Rescue Committee, Mortality in the Democratic Republic of Congo: Results 
from a Nationwide Survey. 
10  Mid-2004, a new humanitarian crisis developed in south-western Congo, where artisan gold 
miners were being brutally expelled from Angola. A UN-OCHA mission estimated the number 
of refugees at 80-100.000. See also: Human Rights Watch, Angola: Congolese Migrants Face 
Brutal Body Searches (23 April 2004). 
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groups that have been marginalised at the local (or sometimes national) 
level, concluded that rebellion provided them with a means of achieving 
some form of immediate redress against, or revenge for, their 
grievances. The proliferation and multiplication of foreign and local 
armies, rebel movements and militias has led to a very intricate and 
highly unpredictable situation in which the scope of violence expanded 
dramatically.  This Congolese ‘complex of war’ was further consolidated 
by two dynamics. On the one hand, new driving forces replaced the 
original causes of conflict. It has been observed that in most armed 
conflicts, “issues which lead to the emergence of conflict are not 
necessarily those which cause its intractability or longevity”11. This is 
undoubtedly true for eastern Congo, where the structural elements that 
have caused the conflict in 1996, have been replaced by new, local and 
regional causes of war.  On the other hand, since 1996, strategic and 
nationally oriented agendas have tended to ‘dissolve’ into more local and 
individual motivations for warfare, leading to a total fragmentation of the 
politico-military landscape12.   
 
The first element of this fragmentation was the growing division within 
the main rebel movement (the ‘Congolese Rally for Democracy’ or RCD) 
into opposing factions, which had the effect of intensifying the armed 
struggle in the eastern parts of the DRC.  This process of political 
disintegration was partly due to a total lack of cohesion (itself the result 
of opportunistic strategies of its main leaders) within the RCD-movement 
itself.  The first split to emerge was in May 1999, after RCD leader Ernest 
11  Goodhand, J. & D. Hulme, NGOs and Peace Building in Complex Political Emergencies: An 
Introduction, NGOS and CPEs Working Paper, No. 1, Manchester: IDPM, University of 
Manchester and Intrac, 1997, p. 7. 
12  This evolution corresponds with the observation of Ken Menkhaus that the conflict in Somalia 
has led to a “radical localization of politics”. It is indeed this institutionalisation of local agendas 
for war that constitutes the main characteristic of many African conflicts:  Menkhaus, K., 
Vicious Circles and the Security Development Nexus in Somalia, in: Conflict, Security and 
Development, 4 (2), August 2004. 
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Wamba-dia-Wamba had fallen out with the original RCD-leadership.  
Wamba created a rival RCD-faction, the ‘RCD-Mouvement de Libération’ 
(RCD-ML), which soon gave rise to a next internal power struggle within 
the RCD-ML movement itself. A second dynamic of fragmentation was 
the growing conflict between Rwanda and Uganda and the manipulation 
by both countries of their Congolese proxies.  The factional split within 
the RCD could be explained in part by the competition between Rwanda 
and Uganda for the control over Kisangani and its diamond market, while 
the internal crisis of the RCD-ML can also be explained as the result of 
Uganda’s divide-and-rule tactics13.  After only one year of military 
struggle against the Kabila-regime, hostilities between the RCD’s 
sponsors had led to a reconfiguration of the rebellion between a 
Rwanda-controlled section (RCD-G) and a Uganda-controlled offshoot 
(RCD-ML).  This led in turn to a carving up of the Congolese territory into 
four separate politico-military regions, each of which were controlled by 
different rebel groups. 
  
In addition to the disintegration of the main rebel movement, the 
entrance of new actors and the formation of new (local and regional) 
coalitions further complicated the armed struggle in eastern DRC.  Apart 
from growing urban resistance by civil society and church leaders, the 
RCD-rebellion gave a new breath to the formation of rural militias, also 
known as Mayi-Mayi.  Originally, most of these Mayi-Mayi groups were 
the result of spontaneous mobilisation and had a very limited impact on 
the local power-game. The process of militia-formation started as a rural 
reaction of youngsters against Mobutu’s political system (which was held 
responsible for the lack of social and economic opportunities), yet came 
to be an important instrument of local elites in their campaign against the 
13  Human Rights Watch, Uganda in Eastern DRC: Fuelling Political and Ethnic Strife, March 
2001.  
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Banyarwanda in North Kivu in 1993.  In 1996, these militias briefly joined 
the Kabila-led military campaign to oust Mobutu, but turned against 
Kabila when the ‘Tutsi influence’ in Kabila’s movement became too 
visible. Since the outbreak of the second war in 1998, Mayi-Mayi leaders 
also started recruiting the better educated and disenchanted urban youth 
(who were attracted to the alleged objective of fighting the ‘Rwandan 
occupation’). Shared feelings of antipathy towards the ‘tutsi-agressors’ 
also facilitated the creation of stronger links between these diverse local 
groupings and Burundian and Rwandan militias that were operating from 
Congolese soil. In addition, these militias also became an attractive force 
for several political and economic actors as well as social movements. 
After the signing of the Lusaka-Accords, in 1999 (in which the Mayi-Mayi 
groups were not officially included), the Kinshasa-government started 
providing these groups with arms, which led to a serious progression of 
their military activity and to their subsequent control over large parts of 
the countryside. Finally, also local businessmen tried to mobilize these 
militias as part of their strategies of economic control.  
 
Ituri perhaps is the most dramatic example of these dynamics. Here, a 
local and historical struggle for control and access to land has been 
skilfully exploited by Ugandan army elements who sought to consolidate 
their economic control over this resource-rich region.  As of early 2004, 
at least 5 armed groups were actively involved in the local politico-
military power game. As in the other parts of Eastern Congo, this 
fragmentation has led to a carving up of the territory into a series of rebel 
‘enclaves’, consisting of a series of complex transboundary formations
 8
                                                          
between local elites, regional armed actors and global forces14. 
Qualifying these enclaves as ‘shifting’ underlines the importance of the 
informal alliances between local and regional actors that propped up the 
emanations of authority.  At the same time, it points at the complexity of 
the local politico-military power-game.  In some cases, the emerging 
alliance between rural armed actors, economic entrepreneurs and local 
administrative authorities has created a certain degree of political and 
economic continuity within these enclaves, leading in turn to a situation 
of (relative) security.  In other regions, the continuing competition 
between foreign and local militias for the access to (economic and 
political) resources has become the main source of insecurity to the local 
population, creating instead a general environment of violence and 
despair. In most regions, however, some form of accommodation exists 
between these opposing factions and local elites, who appear to have 
found mutual benefit in the existing situation of ‘no-armed-conflict-nor-
peace’.  It could be said that the ‘smouldering’ nature of the Congolese 
conflict carries both elements of stability and instability, depending on the 
access and entitlement to local livelihood options. The social 
transformations that have resulted from this accommodation have led in 
turn to the consolidation of new forms of social control, economic 
dominance and protection. 
 
14  This observation corresponds to the recent discussion by amongst others Thomas Callaghy, 
Ronald Kassimir and Robert Latham, of ‘transboundary formations’: Callaghy, T., Kassimir, R. 
and Latham, R., Intervention and Transnationalism in Africa. Global-Local networks of Power 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). For a similar argument, see: M. Duffield,  
Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development and Security (London: 
Zed Books, 2002).  
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2.        Processes of Social Transformation in eastern DRC15
A first element of the social transformation process in eastern DRC has 
been an intensified struggle for the access to land and natural resources. 
The competition over land became visible for the first time in the province 
of North Kivu in 1993, when a conflict erupted over the unequal access 
to arable and grazing lands between the allochthonous Banyarwanda 
and autochthonous Banyanga and Bahunde communities. Gradually, this 
conflict over land (the single most important local economic resource) 
came to dominate the local armed competition in the whole of eastern 
DRC, a competition that became progressively defined in ethnic terms. 
The best known of these conflicts was the struggle for land between 
Hema and Lendu in Ituri.  However, also in other parts of eastern Congo, 
local disputes for economic resources came to be translated into ethnic 
terms.  The reasons for this ‘ethnicisation’ have been threefold. First, 
access to land already formed one of the main currencies of power 
during colonial times; in the post-colonial era, it became one of the 
central elements of the political economy of the DRC. Control over land 
indeed represents a multi-dimensional resource: it is used as a 
community territory, as an economic resource, as a source of 
administrative revenue, and as a social asset. It is therefore significant in 
terms of ethnic identity-formation, the powers and revenue-streams of 
local customary leaders, and market penetration of rural economies. A 
second and related reason is that during the war, ethnicity has evolved 
into a crucial resource in the hands of local elites and armed actors for 
the mobilization of political and economic resources. On the one hand, 
reference to ethnic belonging has become an inherent part of local 
recruitment strategies by non-state armed actors: rebel groups have 
progressively recruited along ethnic lines to ensure their grip on 
15  This section of the article is a summary of the authors’ publication Conflict and Social 
Transformation in eastern DR Congo (Ghent: Academia Press, 2004). 
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economic resources and the population. On the other hand, armed 
groups also depend on access to local markets and resources for the 
financing of their private and military operations. The connection 
between ethnicity and territorial control thus not only ensures these 
armed actors of a relatively stable economic reward, but also confines 
the communities under their control to a channelled territorial access: 
who controls the land, controls its people16. What arises from this internal 
dynamic could be defined otherwise as a ‘territorialisation of ethnicity’ 
around vital economic assets, whereby violent and ‘ethnic’ elements 
have gradually come to constitute the starting point for any form of socio-
economic integration17. As the continuing confrontations between the 
Lendu and Hema in Ituri, the Banyarwanda and Hunde and other 
populations in North and South Kivu demonstrate, this growing 
interconnection between ethnicity and economic survival by local armed 
groups has not only led to a strong demarcation of (physical and 
‘imagined’) boundaries between previously coexisting communities, but 
the allegiance to this violent enterprise has also become an important 
element in the definition of one’s individual political and social position. 
 
Apart from its ethnic connotation, the intensified struggle over local 
resources has also engendered a transformation of the social space. 
During the war, the artisan exploitation of natural resources –already 
largely present during the Mobutu era – has become one of the most 
important survival strategies for eastern Congo’s rural populations. This 
is especially true for the younger generations, who traditionally form the 
most mobile parts of society. For them, the access to ‘quick financial 
16  Pottier, J., Emergency in Ituri, DRC: Political Complexity, Land and Other Challenges in 
Restoring Food Security, paper presented at the FAO International Workshop ‘Food Security 
in Complex Emergencies: Building Policy Frameworks to Address Longer-Term Programming 
Challenges’, 23-25 September 2003, Tivoli, Italy. 
17  See also Le Billon, P., ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, 
in: Political Geography, Vol. 20, pp. 561-584. 
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gain’ in local exploitation and trade networks not only constitutes an 
economic alternative to their miserable livelihoods (characterised by 
decreasing land access and growing food insecurity), but it also presents 
them with an alternative social identity.  This alternative living condition – 
or better said, the aspiration to it – is progressively mirrored by young 
combatants and non-combatants alike against the modern and capitalist 
lifestyles of metropolitan Western societies.  As one youngster told us in 
the gold centre of Kamituga (in South Kivu): “In society, to represent 
something you have to have something.” (“il faut avoir quelque chose 
pour être apprécié dans la société”)18 Still, it has to be noted that this 
new ‘ideal model’ – which increasingly refers to violent and socially 
exclusive forms of integration – also has an important downside. In the 
absence of alternative exit strategies, the exploitation of gold, diamonds 
or coltan is increasingly engendering new patterns of physical 
dependency for these youngsters – some may even call it a ‘daily drug’ 
(“une dépendance quotidienne”)19 – especially if confronted with the 
meagre income it generates for their daily survival: in Congo’s wartime 
economy, gold and diamonds merely present a way to escape daunting 
poverty.   
 
A final dimension of this social transformation process has been a shift in 
local authority structures to the advantage of violent and armed actors. 
On the one hand, this shift has involved a preponderance of armed 
actors over ‘traditional’ (customary or administrative) rulers.  Research in 
North Kivu and South Kivu has demonstrated how various rural militias 
have replaced customary chiefs as references of authority; in turn, these 
armed actors installed their own structures of political authority and 
18  Interview with young miners, Kamituga, December 2003. 
19  Interview with young miners, Kamituga, December 2003. 
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control, which were often based on pre-war administrative structures20. In 
most rural areas, traditional decision makers such as elders and 
customary chiefs have either lost their position, or have had no other 
option than to sustain the strategies of a new generation of young 
combatants that are, in the pursuit of their interests, becoming 
increasingly powerful in the regulation of local socio-economic 
interaction. So, while all credible politics have been reduced to armed 
politics, this new logic of violence has subsequently led to a complete 
erosion of more traditional forms of authority and solidarity, which in itself 
has facilitated the formation of new sources of power.  
 
On the other hand, this shift in local authority structures has also had a 
serious impact on the regulation of local economic competition. To 
survive economically – and face external competition – commercial 
entrepreneurs have often had to align themselves with local militias to 
protect their endangered economic enterprise – a service that is mostly 
returned through some kind of financial reward. In other words, the 
‘smouldering’ nature of the conflict in eastern Congo has sometimes led 
to a situation of mutual benefit: while militias profit from the presence of 
existing exploitation and trade networks to skim off profits, they are 
simultaneously deployed by local entrepreneurs to protect their local 
enterprises. As a result, both militias and opportunistic businessmen 
(such as certain traders, middlemen or outright criminals) have 
increasingly profited from the low-intensity nature of the Congolese 
conflict because they can use the subsequent distortion of commodity 
and resource markets to monopolise local resource exploitation and 
trade. Obviously then, these actors have every intention to prolong their 
20  For a discussion, see amongst others: Van Acker, F. and K. Vlassenroot, ‘Youth and conflict in 
Kivu: ‘Komona clair’, in: The Journal of Humanitarian Assistance, 2000; and Van Acker, F. and 
K. Vlassenroot, ‘Les ‘Maï- Maï’ et les fonctions de la violence milicienne dans l’est du Congo’, 
in: Politique africaine, Vol. 84, pp. 103-116. 
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beneficial relationship, even after an official conflict settlement has been 
concluded.  
 
Although these observations seem to confirm at least partially the 
argument of political economists about the interconnection between 
natural resources, trade and the prolongation of conflict21, this 
relationship has not been as one-dimensional as it has often been 
presented.  The data at hand suggest that it is generally not (only) the 
military that profit from this economic violence. Rather, their financial 
woes as well as their lack of control over the country’s interior (where 
natural resources are exploited) ultimately make them inferior to 
established and pre-existing trade networks. This observation 
corresponds with other notions on the Congolese trade networks in 
general. As one observer stated, “the numerous pre-existing and 
sometimes highly structured informal networks were not created by 
military involvement, although they have been controlled by them… [The 
military] do however try to exploit [these] networks for their own profit, by 
controlling essential points of access such as airports and trading posts 
in order to levy taxes.”22 In general, the natural resource sector has 
always formed a daunting quagmire for both African rebels and 
governments, first because of the powerful position of various 
‘middlemen’ that skim off the benefits of this trade, and second because 
21  For example according to Paul Collier, rebels and opportunistic businessmen commonly 
benefit from war because they can extort natural resource exports (amongst others through 
taxation, control of strategic entry and exit points, etc.) and they can monopolise the entry and 
information flow into commodity markets; this form of disruption is generally leading to a 
criminalisation and a monopolisation of trade: Collier, P., Doing Well Out of War (Paper 
prepared for Conference on Economic Agendas in Civil Wars, London, April 26-27, 1999); see 
also: Le Billon, P., ‘The Political Ecology of War: Natural Resources and Armed Conflicts’, pp. 
561-584. 
22  Kennes, E., ‘Footnotes to the Mining Story’, in: Review of African Political Economy, n° 93/94, 
vol. 29, September-December 2002.  
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of the persistence of powerful informal economies that by definition 
escape formal control mechanisms23. 
 
More than an ‘economy of plunder’ based on rebel predation, therefore, 
the conflict in eastern Congo appears to have led to the establishment of 
several informal governance structures, which are progressively setting 
the frame for local (socio-) economic interaction. Instead of leading to a 
breakdown or chaos, contemporary conflicts like the war in the DRC thus 
seem to bear the potential of creating new complexes of “profit, power 
and protection.”24 These complexes could be described as parallel 
governance structures that function next to the formal state apparatus 
(and sometimes make use of it) to foster an independent process of 
politico-military control, of economic redistribution and of rights to wealth. 
These complexes have made use of the withering state competence to 
consolidate themselves as new centres of authority, economic regulation 
and social control.  However, while these complexes are almost 
invariably non-liberal (or informal, transboundary) and socially exclusive 
(ethnic, clan-based) in nature, their outcomes tend to differ according to 
the specific socio-political context. 
 
A good example of the emergence of such an ‘emerging complex’ is the 
conflict in Ituri, where the subsequent Ugandan occupations (1996-1997; 
1998-2003) gave rise to a military-commercial collaboration between  
some Ugandan army officers and certain local (Hema/Gegere) elites. 
Combining the advantages of a favourable political position – stemming 
largely from the Hema/Gegere’s (post-) colonial dominance in local 
23  For a discussion, see Shaw, M., The Middlemen: War Supply Networks in Sierra Leone and 
Angola (The Hague: Clingendael Institute, 2002). 
24  Ballentine, K. and J. Sherman (eds.), The Political Economy of Armed Conflict. Beyond Greed 
and Grievance. Mark Duffield takes this argument further and states that “instead of complex 
political emergencies, global governance is encountering emerging political complexes on its 
borders.”: Duffield, M., Global Governance and the New Wars. The Merging of Development 
and Security (London: Zed Books, 2002).   
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politics, the economy and education – and the free hand that the 
Ugandan President gave to his officers to engage in privatised warfare, 
both these actors have used their military and economic strength to 
construct themselves a profitable niche in the regional political economy. 
Thanks to its monopolisation of trade and access to resources (i.e. land 
and gold) this transborder power complex has been increasingly 
successful in fostering an alternative and largely stateless process of 
legitimisation, redistribution and rights to wealth to its members. This 
process has not been limited to the members of the Gegere community, 
but eventually also affected other governance complexes in the area, 
including the Ugandan political equilibrium25.  
 
A similar evolution could be observed in the region of Beni-Lubero (North 
Kivu), which is primarily inhabited by the Nande community. Here, the 
Nande’s historical involvement in the informal economy was used both 
as an instrument to preserve their dominance in regional commerce and 
as a fence against patrimonialist state interference under Mobutu. During 
the war, a new nexus of power emerged that united the need of both the 
local RCD-ML rebel movement and certain entrepreneurs to block 
interference in local business. To a certain extent, the private protection 
mechanisms that resulted from this relationship between rebels and 
entrepreneurs even stimulated some form of social redistribution26. 
Nevertheless, it must be acknowledged that this ‘reciprocal assimilation’ 
between rebels and commercial elites also stimulated a deepening 
political and economic fragmentation. The immediate result of this 
process is that today, the low-intensity conflict in Beni-Lubero has been 
25  For a discussion, see Vlassenroot, K. and T.Raeymaekers, The Politics of Rebellion and 
Intervention in Ituri: The Emergence of a New Political Complex ?, in: African Affairs, 103, pp. 
385-412. 
26  In this context, we can refer to the reinvestment of informal trade profits by local Nande elites 
in the commercial centre of Butembo, where Nande traders are currently building a private 
airport and dam to provide the city with electricity: see Vlassenroot, K. and T. Raeymaekers, 
Conflict and Social Transformation in Eastern DR Congo (Gent: Academia Press, 2004). 
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traded for a situation of violent peace, in which the continuing predation 
by local militias and former rebel leaders has been accompanied by 
increasing levels of intra- and intercommunal conflict. 
 
Finally, in Masisi a local complex consisting of an NGO (‘Tout pour la 
Paix et le Développement’), Local Defence Forces and administrative 
control led by Provincial Governor Eugène Serufuli has enabled certain 
Banyarwanda elites to consolidate their political and economic interests 
within a single political framework. This complex offers an illustrative 
example of how local elites have combined foreign and national support 
networks to protect their local interests. Although initially backed by 
Rwanda, Serufuli has used this structure during the transition process to 
pressurise himself into a dominant political position at a national level27. 
While this project has certainly added to the internal strife in this region, 
the immediate reward has been a consolidation of Banyarwanda power 
in Rutshuru and Masisi, including an extension of cattle and grazing land. 
 
To summarise our argument, we think that the war in eastern Congo has 
resulted in the emergence of various ‘complexes of power’, which have 
planted themselves on the challenges of both increasing state ‘collapse’ 
and global warfare to foster new modes of social and economic 
integration. Invariably, these complexes have emerged from the 
cornerstones of the pre-war, (neo-) patrimonialist system, namely the 
access and entitlement to vital economic assets. The accommodation of 
local elites and armed actors to enduring conflict has led in turn to a 
preponderance of ethnicity in the definition of political and economic 
belonging, an evolution that led to the development of new strategies of 
political and economic regulation that are almost always socially 
exclusive and non-liberal (or transboundary, protectionist and stateless) 
27  Serufuli currently holds the office of provincial governor of North Kivu. 
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in nature.  At different levels, these strategies have resulted in the 
formation of new complexes of ‘power, profit and protection’ that are 
characterised by a militarized control over local resources, trading 
networks and mobility patterns, and by new forms of (regional and 
global) economic integration.  Finally, these complexes have had a 
double effect on the local societies we have analysed.  On the one hand, 
they have seriously disrupted traditional social and economic structures, 
leading in turn to a breakdown of the old social order. On the other hand, 
they represent the structural answer of a marginalized population to a 
situation of enduring conflict, carrying in it new elements of integration 
and transformation, and carried forward by a redefinition of authority at a 
grassroots level of society. In sum, this evolution confirms the earlier 
statement that conflict is not only about breakdown and chaos, but can 
carry the germs of a new political order. 
 
3.  State Implosion and Ethnic Politics: Two Reinforcing 
Dynamics 
The process of spiralling state implosion and the emergence of new 
centres of power, profit and protection presents a number of fundamental 
difficulties for the formal framework of the transition process in the DRC. 
The war has demonstrated that interests of local elites are best served 
through their association with informal and stateless governance 
structures. As a result, the survival of local power projects does not 
depend so much on the willingness of their leaders to integrate in some 
form of national state formation process, but instead is carried forward by 
their success in amplifying and extending their local interests within the 
informal transboundary power framework.  
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It is evident that the reference to these exclusive and stateless patterns 
of power largely contrasts with the inclusive and formal state formation 
proposed in the Congolese transition process. Starting with the signing of 
the Lusaka cease-fire agreement in 1999, and culminating in the 
inauguration of the Transitional Government in June 2003 in Kinshasa, 
this process has been carried forward by the international community as 
a guarantee for national and regional stability. Until today, this process 
has nonetheless concentrated largely on the implementation of political 
agreements at a national level. This has included the foundation of a 
Transitional Government and other political institutions, as well as a 
number of financial initiatives to get the national economy back on track. 
But although this transition has undoubtedly reached a number of 
successes (the most important of which are the reaching of a military 
stalemate and an all-inclusive power-sharing agreement in the country’s 
capital), some contentious and unresolved issues nonetheless 
demonstrate a more general problem of accepting this internationally 
induced drive to peace and democracy. A recent update of the transition 
in Kinshasa and the east of the country clearly indicates this contrasting 
dynamic. According to the update, “the continuing existence of parallel 
structures in the capital, Kinshasa, creates a great deal of confusion and 
also regularly leads to open conflict in the [eastern] provinces. Most, if 
not all, tense situations (...) are attributable to political infighting in the 
Transitional Government. This lack of unity among the members of the 
Transitional Government has a very important, negative impact in the 
Kivu provinces, not least because there are still numerous ethnic and 
political tensions.”28 Such parallel structures have included the 
continuous by-passing of the new military hierarchy through informal 
agreements. For example, there currently exists a parallel unit in the 
28  Romkema, H., Update on the Transition.  The Case of the Kivu Provinces, ISS Situation 
Report, Pretoria, 7 May 2004, p. 2. 
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president’s office called the ‘Maison Militaire’, which gives parallel orders 
to ex-government soldiers and some Mayi-Mayi groups. Similar to these 
dynamics in the state capital Kinshasa, the “calabash of seething political 
and ethnic tensions”29 in the eastern provinces has been generating new 
alliances that are increasingly confronting the formal transition framework 
in Kinshasa.  The events of June 2004 are a sad example of this 
dynamic.  In the eastern Congolese city of Bukavu, a number of army 
commanders that felt excluded from the transition process or rejected 
this process out of fear for prosecution for former war crimes, joinded 
hands and demanded for a change of the command of the 10th military 
region. This mutiny thus risks offering a perfect mobilisation ground to a 
number of actors that do not support the transition process or want to 
reposition themselves.   
 
It could be feared indeed that the combination of transition and 
continuing insecurity in the east could reignite the ‘smouldering’ power 
struggles between local and national political entrepreneurs. While the 
international community seems to be focused on creating a number of 
‘islands of stability’ in Congo – which would include the capital along with 
a number of strategic provincial towns – the entire interior of the country 
thus risks being left behind in a general state of chaos, where historical 
land conflicts, border disputes, and communal resentment will continue 
to be exploited by political entrepreneurs who are in search for a local 
power base. In the meantime, dispersed armed actors continue to profit 
from the extortion of agriculture, trade and exploitation activities – which 
provide the main means of living for eastern Congo’s impoverished 
populations.  In other words, the present peace process risks bringing 
29  R. Lemarchand, The Democratic Republic of Congo: From Collapse to Potential 
Reconstruction, Occasional paper (Copenhagen: Centre for African Studies, 2001, p. 25). 
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peace to the urban populations while leaving the rural populations in the 
midst of unending low-intensity conflict. 
 
Conclusion 
The current drive towards peace and democracy in Africa has once 
again received a moral backlash due to continuing conflict dynamics in 
many African war zones. These areas include the Democratic 
Democratic Republic of the Congo, a country ravaged by a decade of 
warfare and sustained humanitarian crisis. It is the opinion of the authors 
that the failure of the international community to implement peace in the 
DRC is largely due to a misreading (or one might sometimes say no 
reading at all) of local conflict dynamics, which are sustained not only by 
the interests generated by prolonged warfare, but also and foremost by 
the social transformations that have occurred as a result of the 
accommodation and adaptation of grassroots populations to a situation 
of spiralling state implosion. The conflict in the DRC has led to the 
emergence of new ‘complexes of power’, which have taken on this 
double challenge of state implosion and prolonged warfare to foster new 
strategies of social, economic and political integration that are essentially 
illiberal (informal and transboundary) and socially exclusive (or ethnic) in 
character. Until the peace building interventions thoroughly acknowledge 
and integrate these strategies, it has to be feared that the ‘transition’ to 
peace and democracy will remain radically opposed to the real 
transformations that continue to define the lives of ordinary citizens in 
many parts of this war-torn country. 
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